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Abstract—Security for smart industrial systems is prominent
due to the proliferation of cyber threats threatening national
critical infrastructures. Smart grid comes with intelligent ap-
plications that can utilize the bidirectional communication net-
work among its entities. Microgrids are small-scale smart grids
that enable Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications as they
can operate with some degree of independence from the main
grid. In addition to protecting critical microgrid applications,
an underlying key management scheme is needed to enable
secure M2M message transmission and authentication. Existing
key management schemes are not adequate due to microgrid
special features and requirements. We propose the Micro sElf-
orgaNiSed mAnagement (MENSA), which is the first hybrid key
management and authentication scheme that combines Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Web-of-Trust concepts in micro-
grids. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of
MENSA in terms of scalability and swiftness.
Keywords—Microgrid, Security, Machine-to-Machine, Key man-
agement
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decades, nation states turn to renewable
sources to diversify their energy mix and cope with the
increasing demand for energy power. The traditional power
grid can neither cope with the efficient management of diverse
energy sources nor can respond effectively to events leading to
blackouts. The introduction of Information and Communica-
tion Technology (ICT) to traditional power networks provides
certain advantages like efficiency, reliability, resilience, and
distributed intelligence. This led to the proliferation of smart
grid as the next generation of the power grid.
Along with smart grid, the microgrid concept gains pop-
ularity. A microgrid is formed by a group of electricity
producers and consumers in a limited geographic location. It
is typically connected to a smart grid but it can also operate
autonomously, in an “islanded” mode, depending on physical
conditions and policies agreed among its members. A micro-
grid is a network of interconnected smart devices that have
the ability to communicate bidirectionally either by using the
aforementioned machine-to-machine (M2M) communication
paradigm in islanded mode, or through the internet. Microgrids
utilize power consumption-oriented applications which are of
highly sensitive nature. This poses the requirement for trusted
communication within the network.
The similarities and dependence between microgrids and
smart grids [1] expose them to common cyber threats [2], [3],
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[4]. To mitigate the risk associated with a number of threats,
key management can support cryptographic operations required
for securing microgrid M2M communications and establishing
trust relationships.
The major challenges, which specifically concern key man-
agement in microgrid networks, are the following:
C1. a microgrid is a network with high churn meaning that
nodes frequently join and leave, affecting the efficiency
of centralized solutions due to the overhead created by
multiple and constant node connection requests to a single
entity;
C2. when the Certification Authority (CA) is compromised,
the traditional approach is to revoke all certificates issued
and this is an administratively intensive task that would
temporarily obstruct the smooth operation and impair
information exchange;
C3. a microgrid can operate either in parallel with an existing
power grid or in an “islanded” mode using the M2M com-
munication paradigm; if smart meters lose connectivity to
the CA, e.g. due to network outages, it is not currently
feasible to validate their certificates affecting the security
level of the entire microgrid and the seamless execution
of the processes performed inside the network; and
C4. the storage of certificates to a central server creates a
single point of failure which may result in the discontin-
uation of all network operations.
In this paper, we resolve these issues by proposing a novel
key management scheme. Nodes can join and leave frequently
without having a negative impact on the network’s efficiency,
and if the endorser of the certificates gets discredited, no
certificate revocation will be required. Similarly, if the endorser
becomes unavailable, the network operations will not cease.
Due to the MENSA’s decentralized nature, there is no single
point of failure. We have particularly focused on proposing
a fast, flexible and scalable solution with low overhead that
requires the minimum number of modifications, in terms of
software and hardware, to the microgrid nodes. MENSA has
the ability to operate without a CA, as a decentralized and
distributed network; consequently the CA-related operational
problems and security threats mentioned above are mitigated.
In this paper, we present a distributed and scalable key
management and authentication scheme for microgrids, namely
the Micro sElf-orgaNiSed mAnagement (MENSA). We build
on the basic concepts of the scheme presented in [5] and
provide a detailed description of all key management opera-
tions presenting a complete solution tailored to microgrids. We
have implemented and experimentally evaluated MENSA in
microgrid environments. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper that combines (a) PKI and (b) the WoT concept
found in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [6], in a hybrid solution
providing efficient look-ups of trust relationships, key manage-
2ment, entity authentication. It also ensures device integrity by
employing remote attestation in microgrids. MENSA presents
advantages over existing schemes, like efficiency, scalability
and decentralization. Additionally, for credential protection
and critical operation execution, especially on the smart meter
side that the customer has physical access to, we propose the
utilization of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [7].
In the next section we discuss related work and background
on key management approaches for smart grids. Section III
describes MENSA. Section IV presents simulation-based per-
formance results for MENSA while Section V discusses secu-
rity related issues and gives a critical overview of this paper.
Finally, Section VI summarizes important points and concludes
this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a large number of key management schemes
for smart grid architectures, which have been proved to be
insecure and susceptible to different attacks. The solution in [8]
combines elliptic curve public key cryptography based on the
Needham-Schroeder protocol, along with symmetric keys for
the agents to communicate with each other; however, it is
susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks [9]. The authors of [9]
propose a symmetric key distribution scheme by utilizing a
trusted third party, mainly to address problems in the literature
regarding the certificate revocation process; this solution was
also found to be vulnerable to an impersonation attack [10].
One of the most straightforward, yet insecure, key management
methods is sharing a single symmetric key among many or
even all smart grid nodes, used by systems like [11]. In such a
system, if one node is compromised, then the whole network
is at risk.
There are more works that propose key management
schemes for smart grids, like [12], [13], [14], [15] and [16].
However, most of them target large network infrastructures
controlled by a CA. This architecture is not suitable for
microgrids that by definition can operate autonomously using
the machine-to-machine communication paradigm (C3). [12]
and [13] are based on binary trees to manage secret keys shared
among network entities. [14] uses symmetric keys with fre-
quent key updates among the nodes of the smart grid, hindering
scalability. [15] employs a trusted third party to wirelessly
manage and distribute encryption keys that will be used on
meter data, based on the location of the smart meters. Au-
thors in [16] proposed a mechanism for mutual authentication
between a smart meter and an authentication server, utilizing
Enhanced Identity-Based Cryptography (EIBC) for securing
smart grid communications using a public key infrastructure.
There are some schemes that are closer to MENSA, since
they exclusively focus on key management in microgrids.
First, the solution in [17] requires the microgrid nodes to
be organized in a binary tree. When a node joins or leaves
the network, partial key update is performed from the parent
of the joining/leaving node up to the root of the tree. This
solution cannot cope with (C1), presented in the previous
section. In [18] the functionality of the proposed distributed
key management approach for microgrids is based on an one-
way function tree. In this case, partial key update is needed
when nodes join or leave the microgrid (C1). The solution
in [19] utilizes a key management server to store microgrid
keys creating a single point of failure (C4). In [20] another
approach to key management is presented, where the scheme
operates as a hierarchical network, with a pair-wide key pre-
distribution on the microgrid’s devices.
A reminiscent of our proposed solution is Chord-PKI [21],
a generic scheme which combines PKI with Chord for se-
cure communications over P2P networks, utilizing threshold
cryptography. On the contrary, in order to avoid the hurdles
of threshold cryptography that requires the use of CAs to
distribute the key shares (C2), our work makes use of WoT
instead. To the best of our knowledge, the only solution that
applies Chord in the smart grid domain is [22]. However, their
approach is focused only on improving the management of
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), which is only one aspect
of a key management scheme.
III. MENSA
This section presents in detail the Micro sElf-orgaNiSed
mAnagement (MENSA) scheme. First, an overview of the
architecture and operation of a microgrid is given, followed
by the basic building blocks and operations of MENSA.
A. Functional Components
The components that comprise a basic microgrid infrastruc-
ture are presented in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Functional components of a microgrid.
In Figure 1, the TEE is depicted as a standalone element for
demonstration purposes. This is embedded in the smart meter.
The microgrid can either be connected to the main utility grid
or operate in a standalone “islanded” mode. In the former
case, the microgrid is able to sell or buy energy from the grid
according to its members’ needs.
B. Architecture
We assume that in each home or building there are one or
more smart meters connected to a segmented mesh network,
which further includes aggregators assisting the electricity
provider with the collection of information from the smart
meters and also introducing new nodes to the network. Despite
the existence of an hierarchical structure and many sub-
networks forming a main grid, separated with firewalls from
each other, integrating MENSA into such networks does not
introduce any impediments. Each part of the network can have
its own MENSA structure and communicate with the utility
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Fig. 2: MENSA as an overlay network.
independently. A single smart meter can be connected to sev-
eral appliances or renewable energy resources in order to send
commands and measure energy consumption or production.
Each smart meter contains a special element that implements
a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to protect the device’s
private keys [23], [24], [25]. In this way, the device’s private
keys can only be used from within the TEE and they are never
exposed to anyone that has physical access to the device.
Figure 2 shows MENSA as an overlay network within the
microgrid architecture. MENSA resides on top of a logical
layer, an overlay, which allows bi-directional communications
among the microgrid components. This is a Distributed Hash
Table (DHT) layer that provides a generic DHT functionality,
where we can store overlay (key, value) pairs, as in every other
locally stored hash table, and retrieve the value back based
on the key. MENSA is based on Stoica’s Chord [26], where
nodes are placed as IDs occupying a circular identifier space;
in our case, the smart grid and each node of the microgrid
are represented as a single node of the Chord ring. Chord
is scalable and efficient, requiring O(logN) communication
hops, where N is the total number of nodes in the system.
Chord and Kademlia are considered the main DHT candi-
dates for P2P communication [27]. Despite that when using
Kademlia to relay messages shorter paths are formed, Chord
provides better scalability when considering messaging cost
and a smaller average packet size [27], causing less overhead
at the network. The overlay can support diverse applications
that require efficient look-up services, like authentication with
MENSA; other services that could benefit from the overlay
include billing, and secure aggregation.
Above the DHT layer there is MENSA, according to which
the overlay key of a node n is Kn = h (Pkn + IDdevice). This
concatenation makes use of a public key Pkn (a key stored
to each node, details will be provided in the next section)
and it ensures that Kn will be unique even when the device
identifiers are not. On the other hand, the overlay value is
the digital certificate of the node, which follows the OpenPGP
message format [6] creating the MENSA ring. This serves as
a certificate storage and query structure. The certificates are
stored in the DHT in a distributed fashion. Upon a direct
trust path creation between node A and node B, node A
retrieves B′s certificate and checks its validity. If successful,
A inserts node B in its routing table; this is called finger
table, as in Chord. These steps (presented in more detail at
Section III-D) are repeated, creating a Web-of-Trust (WoT).
Finally, a MENSA ring is a Chord ring which uses the tuple
(Kn, Certn) as (key, value).
C. Prerequisites and assumptions
Initially, node n has to generate a Kn, as presented in
Section III-B, to connect to the overlay. As a first step, n
receives or generates a key pair Pkn/Skn, upon which the
creation of a self-signed certificate is based. Then, n receives a
certificate Certn signed by other nodes that act as introducers
to the MENSA ring. Certificate Certn follows the OpenPGP
message format [6] and, apart from the first signature from
the introducers, it can carry signatures from other endorsers if
needed. Introducers can be the administrative owners or other
“empowered” nodes of the microgrid acting on a local level.
D. Node join
In order to join the MENSA ring, a node should first have
its certificate signed by at least one introducer that owns a
valid certificate otherwise the node cannot join the ring. The
more signatures the certificates get from introducers, the easier
the creation of trusted paths becomes and a safeguard is in
place in case of an unavailable or compromised introducer. The
selection of the certificates that shall be checked upon a node’s
join is linked to the creation of its finger table according to
Chord. Each node possesses this table containing a list of next
hops to be used when executing a search, ensuing improved
look up operation. MENSA nodes that do not have a certificate
signed by a trusted introducer, are considered untrusted and
cannot be included in finger tables, hence they do not become
a part of the network’s WoT. The join operation is concluded
when the new node verifies the validity of all certificates
assigned to the nodes in its finger table.
Node join can be explained as follows. We assume that node
n wants to join the MENSA ring shown in Figure 2. First, n
gets its certificate signed by one, at least, introducer, which
here is b. When n joins the ring, Chord assigns to its finger
table one or more node IPs. Node n will check the validity of
the respective certificates (i.e., overlay values) assigned to the
nodes that are part of its finger table. This validation assures
that a certificate is well-formed, not expired and signed by an
introducer node.
Function nodeJoin(k)
if Certi is valid then
while next (IPk) to be stored in fingerTablen
do
if Certk is signed by introducer i then
// Certk is trusted
n stores IPk in fingerTablen
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Certificate check during node join.
4Function n.find(n′)
if n′ resides in n.fingerTable then
// n′ is trusted
return success
else
send request to the next trusted node p closest to
n′ from node n
if n′ resides in p.fingerTable then
// n′ is trusted
return success
else
send request to the next trusted node k
closest to n′ from node p
.
.
.
end
end
// No trust chain was found
return failure
Algorithm 2: Searching for another network node.
The formal process is presented in Algorithm 1. When the
IP values have been assigned to a node n’s finger table on
the Chord level, n goes through all of them to check the
corresponding certificates. At first, n checks the validity of
the introducer’s certificate Certi; if it is valid and Certn is
signed by it, then the corresponding IP is saved in the finger
table.
E. Normal operation
After the node join procedure takes place, the microgrid
operates with certificates signed by the introducers. If an
introducer’s certificate is compromised, invalid, expired or its
validity cannot be verified (e.g., due to intermittent commu-
nication or no connectivity), all operations (apart from node
join) can be executed based on signatures from the rest of
the microgrid’s introducers. When a node n wants to securely
communicate with a node n′ using MENSA, a standard chord
search will commence. This action can be executed efficiently
utilizing the Chord ring that has already been formed and
contains routing tables with nodes that are already part of the
WoT. Using its finger table, n will eventually locate n′.
An example operation of MENSA is demonstrated with the
help of Figure 2. We assume that node n wants to communicate
securely with node p; this is feasible by performing a chord
search utilizing the finger tables that contain only trusted
nodes. Algorithm 2 presents this formal process. An iterative
search commences from node n to find a node with n′ stored
in its finger table. As long as the search does not locate the
desired node, chain length grows. If there is no node that trusts
n′, the search is deemed unsuccessful.
F. Certificate revocation
Regarding certificate revocation, in a distributed system like
a microgrid, a typical Certificate Revocation List (CRL) may
be difficult to manage [22]. In MENSA there are three ways
to revoke a certificate: implicitly, explicitly by the same node,
or explicitly by another node.
The implicit revocation of Certn is the simplest one: each
certificate is revoked after its expiration time has passed.
Expired certificates are recognized during normal certificate
verification. To facilitate this, in the finger tables, IPs are
accompanied by an expiration timestamp. The node with the
expired certificate will have to get through the verification
process again.
In the second case, a node can revoke its own certificate by
using a revocation certificate, as described in OpenPGP [6].
The revocation certificate of a node n (RevCn) is a certificate
that revokes n’s public key and it is signed by n’s private key.
The revocation certificate does not require the knowledge of
the private key. In order to cover cases where n’s private key
is lost or not accessible, RevCn is created at the same time
with the normal certificate Certn and stored locally. A node
n that wants to revoke its certificate does not need to send
the revocation certificate to all nodes in MENSA, but only to
the nodes that have n in their finger table. As a result, n gets
completely cut off from the network’s WoT.
It is also possible that a different node n′ explicitly revokes
Certn. In this case n′ will be an empowered node, like
the introducer, which is authorized to revoke a certificate of
another entity (e.g., a smart meter). To enable n′ to revoke
Certn, node n sends its revocation certificate RevCn to n′
when it is created and n′ stores it locally. Normally, n′ will
revoke Certn if n is misbehaving. Abnormal node behaviour
can be detected utilizing behaviour-based or specification-
based methods like [28].
Trusted computing is intended to provide reliable evidence
about the state of software executing on a system; malicious
behaviour can be identified through remote attestation [29].
Using remote attestation, n′ can determine if n is compromised
and revoke Certn accordingly. Similarly to the previous the
revocation certificate is sent only to the nodes that have n
in their finger table. Here, however, the additional risk is
that n′ can revoke Certn even when it is not necessary,
leading to DoS. In order to minimize this risk, revocation
certificates are stored inside the TEE of the designated node, in
secure persistent storage memory which is cryptographically
protected, like in [30].
G. Trusted Execution Environment
In order to protect elements (e.g., smart meters) that reside
on the customers’ premises from intervention, MENSA adopts
the concept of TEE [7] to provide a protected environment
with limited access. A TEE provides a trusted computing en-
vironment utilizing two virtual processing cores with different
privileges to create two “worlds”: the Normal, for executing
common application processes, and the Secure, for executing
security-sensitive code only. We used a slightly modified
version of the trusted computing environment proposed in [25],
utilizing PGP certificates. The employed TEE supports the
following operations.
51) Secure storage: In MENSA, the TEE is used as a secure
storage for IPs that reside in finger tables, secret and private
keys, as well as revocation certificates. Secure storage provides
encryption and integrity checking for all saved objects. In this
way, unauthorized access to keys and certificates is prevented
and any modifications are disclosed.
2) Finger Table updates: All the nodes that reside inside a
smart meter’s finger table are considered trusted. It is essential
that the operations related to the processing of the finger tables
are secure and not exposed to tampering. Adversaries could
introduce, to the network, malicious nodes if the finger tables
were updated outside the TEE. In addition to that, normal
nodes could be excluded from the network by being deleted
from finger tables, by unauthorized entities, possibly leading
to DOS attacks.
3) Key revocation: As presented in Section III-F, the certifi-
cate of a node n can be revoked by another node n′. Remote
attestation is a procedure by which n′ can control whether n
runs the designated software/firmware or not; if not, n′ uses
RevCn to revoke Certn. The attester (i.e., n′), is engaged into
a challenge-response protocol with the target node (i.e., n),
where n responds back with a signed hash of its software and
firmware. All operations related to remote attestation are exe-
cuted inside TEE without leaving the protected environment.
Key revocation using remote attestation enables the microgrid
to eliminate modified smart meters that may be malicious,
providing an extra layer of protection against attackers who
target individual smart meters.
4) Security operations: The TEE offers a protected en-
vironment for operations that are directly relevant to key
management such as signing of other certificates. Procedures
that require the use of one or more of the secret or private
keys, like digital signatures, are executed inside the TEE so
that keys or other sensitive material are never exposed to the
potentially hostile environment of the smart meter.
H. Node leave
When a node leaves the network it can explicitly revoke its
certificate, by sending a revocation certificate, or implicitly,
by not taking any action. In the latter case, its certificate will
expire. On the Chord level, a re-organization of the finger
tables will take place. When this happens, the affected nodes
will need to check the certificates of the newly assigned
nodes.For example, in Figure 2 it is inferred that node k is
part of node j′s finger table. If node k leaves the network, the
gap left in j′s finger table will be covered by the successor
of node k, which in this case is node p. Finally, the process
described in Algorithm 1 is followed by node j to check the
validity of Certp.
IV. EVALUATION
First, we evaluate the scalability of MENSA by analyzing
the maximum size of the finger tables in relation to the
microgrid size. Then, we provide experimental results from
implementing MENSA on the OverSim P2P simulator [31] 1.
1For reproducibility purposes we make the simulation code available to the
public (https://github.com/VaiosBolgouras/MENSA).
TABLE I: Effect of ring growth in MENSA.
N fingerTable size
500 8
5,000 12
15,000 13
30,000 14
.
.
5,000,000 22
TABLE II: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Network size up to 3,000 {500 to 30,000}
routingType iterative iterative
joinRetry 2 -
stabilizeDelay 20 sec 20 sec
A. Scalability
The DHT, which is comprised by the Kn/Certn pairs, along
with the nodes’ finger tables are considered the foundation of
MENSA and contribute to the scalability of this implementa-
tion. The entries in the finger table of each node do not increase
substantially with number of nodes, while at the same time
no additional certificates are saved locally. Each node in the
MENSA ring has in its finger table at most a low percentage of
IPs, compared to the number of total network nodes, as shown
in Table I. The values were derived by Theorem 2 from [32],
which states that the searches performed in such a network
have an upper bound of O(logN).
MENSA stores a small number of node IPs in each node
(e.g., a maximum of 14 in a ring of 30,000 nodes). This demon-
strates that MENSA is scalable in microgrid environments
and can also support much larger networks (e.g., 5,000,000
nodes). Further proof of MENSA’s scalability is shown by the
experimental results presented next.
B. Implementation
We have implemented MENSA in C++ and integrated it into
the OverSim P2P network simulation framework. We define
two simulation scenarios: in Scenario 1 nodes are added to
the ring one at a time measuring the Node Join delay, while in
Scenario 2 we have microgrids of stable sizes and we measure
the delay of different operations (e.g. Node Join). An overview
of the simulation parameters can be found in Table II.
In our experiments, the iterative routingType is used. Ac-
cording to this type, the initiating node receives information
from intermediate nodes on how to reach the target of a look-
up operation, as described in the example of Section III-E.
When a node tries to join the ring, it is allowed to perform 2
attempts: this is indicated by the joinRetry parameter. Finally,
stabilizeDelay, which is set to 20 sec, shows the time for which
6the simulation was run before commencing the collection of
results; this is necessary in order to complete the processing
of any unfinished queues from the bootstrapping phase.
In Scenario 1, we consider that at least one introducer node,
with a valid certificate, is available and we evaluate the mean
Node Join delay (more details in Section IV-C). To measure
Node Join delay, the simulator is configured to introduce new
nodes to the microgrid, until a maximum number of 30,000
nodes is reached. In Scenario 2, we run a series of experiments,
using different microgrid sizes, ranging from 500 to 30,000
nodes, and we evaluate the following:
• average trust chain length (Section IV-D)
• probability of finding trust between two random nodes
(Section IV-E)
• average search time when a trusted path between two
random nodes is to be established (Section IV-F)
For host-related delays we employed a trusted computing
enabled smart meter as described in [25], where the TEE
environment is provided by Open-TEE [33]. We introduced
the measured delay of signing a single digital certificate (38.47
ms) by the TEE to the simulation framework. The main
purpose of Open-TEE is to support the development of trusted
applications without relying on any specific hardware platform.
We have implemented MENSA by utilizing Open-TEE as a
proof of concept but also taking into account an alternative
use of Open-TEE mentioned by the authors of [33].
C. Node join
For measuring the delay of a single node joining the
MENSA ring, we implemented Scenario 1. The simulator is
configured to start from a zero-size network and introduce
new nodes, up to a maximum of 30,000 nodes. The join
process of the node includes the operations described in
Section III-D. The new node gets its certificate signed by at
least an introducer, checks the validity of the certificates that
are to be inserted in the finger table and it creates the finger
table.
The simulation results show that for up to 5,000 nodes the
mean join time is 1.55sec, while for Node Joins taking place
between 20,000 to 30,000 nodes, the respective value is 2.2sec.
This slight decline in performance, considering the network’s
magnitude, is mainly a byproduct of the overall increased
requests the microgrid nodes have to process. The certificates’
signing and validation delays also have an impact, though it is
close to negligible because of the increase by just two nodes in
the finger tables’ maximum capacity (shown in Table I). This
means that the introduction of new nodes to the microgrid,
which is executed during the installation of a smart meter, or
when a certificate renewal takes place, has an insignificant and
predictable delay.
D. Trust chain length
In order to measure how the average trust chain length
changes with different sizes of the microgrid, we performed a
series of experiments following Scenario 2. The trust chain is
an ordered list of certificates starting from the node initiating
Fig. 3: Average certificate chain length.
a look-up operation up to the target node; the procedure of
creating a trust chain is described in Section III-E.
The length of the chain includes the initiator and the target
node; for example, a trust chain of length 5 means that three
intermediate nodes are placed between the two aforementioned
nodes. For each request, we randomly select two microgrid
nodes and check if the first can trust the second by using
Algorithm 2.
The graph in Figure 3 shows that a chain length (from 3.7
to 6.7) is expected for microgrid sizes up to 30,000 nodes.
This means that the two nodes trust each other implicitly
with intermediate nodes ranging from 1 to 5 nodes. In a
limited environment like a microgrid, we regard implicit trust
with this number of intermediate nodes as acceptable, thus
MENSA performs adequately in terms of trust. For greater
microgrid sizes, as we can infer from Figure 3, the chain is
not expected to increase significantly; indicatively, the chain
length from 10,000 to 30,000 has increased only by one,
from approximately 6 to 7, maintaining the trustworthiness
of MENSA operations.
An initial observation here, which also applies to the rest of
the experiments in the following sections, is that no significant
changes are perceived in the microgrids behavior as the size
increases, which is a testament to the scalability of MENSA.
This behavior is the result of the progressive and minimal
increase in the finger table nodes, as presented above in Table I.
E. Probability of finding trust
With this series of experiments we want to determine the
probability that two random nodes will be able to establish trust
relationships between them, even when one of the network’s
introducers has invalid certificate. The network is created
according to Scenario 2. For each request, we first randomly
select two microgrid nodes and check if the first can trust the
second, following Algorithm 2. If trust is found between the
two nodes we mark it as success otherwise we mark it as
7Fig. 4: Average Trust percentage.
failure. In the end, we compute the percentage of successes
against the total requests.
Figure 4 shows that regardless of the microgrid size, it is
almost certain that a trusted path is going to be established. As
the number of nodes in the network increases, the probability
of finding trust also trends upwards, since more paths and
alternative choices that could be utilized to reach a node
become available. After 10,000 nodes we observe very slight
increase, as the probability has almost reached its maximum
value of 1, which means absolute certainty that a trust chain
exists for every potential request. Comparing this result with
a traditional centralized PKI approach with an invalid CA
certificate, the latter would present a 0% of success since all
node certificates would be considered invalid as well.
F. Search time
This series of experiments present the average time needed
for a random node to establish trust relationships with another
random node, according to Scenario 2. The delay was mea-
sured from the time the first node creates the request until the
trust relationship is verified.
Figure 5 shows that for microgrid sizes up to almost 10,000
nodes the average search time is under 1 sec (0.64-1.01), while
it maintains low values up to 1.14 sec as the micro grids
size increases to 30,000 nodes. These low values are mainly a
byproduct of building the trust relationships between the nodes
at the joining stage. A Node Join takes place much more rarely
than searches do, so it makes sense to embody a time and
resource consuming activity like certificate verification at the
earlier stage. Responsible for the increase in search time as the
network size grows is the corresponding increase of the chain
length, as messages need time to be transmitted, received and
processed at each node.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide a security analysis of our scheme
by employing a few representative attack scenarios. For each
Fig. 5: Search Time.
case, we study how MENSA will respond. Next, we review
common issues encountered in ICT, that may appear in a
microgrid as well, and analyze how MENSA alleviates them.
A. Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the possible attack scenarios
derived from the characteristics of our architecture and the
desirable system properties.
1) Node Join: An attempt to insert a fake node controlled
by a malicious party in the MENSA ring could take place.
However, bootstrapping of new nodes is controlled by the
administrative owner of the microgrid, so it would not be
possible for such an action to take effect.
2) Introducer Certificate Revocation: An issue that may
arise when an introducer’s certificate is revoked, is the impact
such an action is going to have on the already deployed
nodes. In the approach followed by a traditional PKI, all
certificates issued by the CA whose certificate is revoked,
would have to be revoked as well and the need for the issuance
of new certificates would arise. In MENSA, a node that has
already joined the microgrid will have its certificate signed
by more than one introducer, and it will be considered valid
until expired or revoked. The main advantage is that when an
introducer’s certificate is revoked, it is not necessary to revoke
any node certificate of the microgrid; existing certificates can
be verified based on other endorsers’ signatures. In practice,
in the traditional case the operation of the microgrid will be
stalled until new certificates are issued, affecting all of its
nodes; in MENSA, operation will continue as usual.
Multiple or all introducer’s certificates getting invalidated at
the same time is considered unlikely, due to the decentralized
and distributed nature of the network. When all the introducers
are compromised at the same time, it would heavily impact on
the network and negatively affect its operations.
3) Byzantine Attacks and Misbehaving nodes: To further
protect the microgrid from attacks where a single or multiple
authenticated devices are compromised and under the control
8of adversaries, we can use a reputation framework to include
ratings from all the transactions between the nodes, in addi-
tion to the above certificate path-building method. On every
communication between an initiating and a target node, an
outcome is recorded and its reputation score is calculated. For
the execution of these transactions and the storage of scores,
the TEE will be used so that not even the nodes themselves
have access to such critical operations and data.
We do not wish to claim specific parameter values as
accurate ratings other than the positive and negative outcomes
between events. For instance, supposing a node j is malicious
and is misbehaving in the look-up operation, node n can
downgrade it in its reputation table and therefore avoid the
problematic node during look-up. After a while, intentional
look-up misbehaviour by specific nodes, whether they are part
of a bigger Byzantine attack scheme, or acting alone, will be
effectively represented in the rest of the ring and they will
result in skipping the misbehaving nodes during the look-up
operation. This approach results in a reputation based path
ranking that is similar to the discrete ranking of PGP Web-of-
Trust [6].
B. Critical Appraisal
In Section I we presented 4 major issues specifically for
key management in microgrids and afterwards showed how
MENSA overcomes them. Here we analyze how MENSA al-
leviates issues that are found in common ICT systems as well.
First of all, our scheme is based on the well-known PGP
Web-of-Trust and asymmetric cryptography operations, so that
it can be considered resilient against well-known attacks, at
least to the extent these two building blocks can be considered
as resilient. It is also robust against key compromise, since
with the utilization of trusted computing, the secret/private
keys never leave the device.
MENSA can support distributed operation of its nodes
given that, after the bootstrapping phase, its operation can
be based on a Web-of-Trust and no unique central TTP is
needed. Hence, it shows high availability even over intermittent
connections or no connectivity at all with part of the microgrid.
Microgrid devices, just like in the smart grid, are expected
to have a long lifetime, in the order of 20 years. MENSA sup-
ports upgradeability since its distributed nature allows digital
certificates to be easily and inexpensively updated with longer
key sizes.
Regarding scalability, MENSA can support large numbers
of devices as after bootstrapping, where the administrative
owner of the microgrid must be involved, MENSA is de-
centralized and there is low administrative cost. Moreover, as
demonstrated in Section IV-A, even large microgrid sizes result
in small finger tables, adding low overhead to each node.
Efficiency is highly related to the hardware that will be used.
Although MENSA utilizes digital certificates and asymmetric
cryptography, there are ways to mitigate the performance
penalty by using session keys based on these certificates. Our
experimental results in Section IV proved that for microgrid
sizes of up to 30,000 nodes, MENSA is efficient even when
using smart meters whose hardware specifications are compa-
rable to embedded devices (e.g., Raspberry Pi).
The computational overhead for the smart meters is min-
imal. Handling and forwarding messages when searches are
performed is a resource consuming task that essentially refers
to carrying out a linear search with complexity O(n) for a
specific node, as shown in Table I. Moreover, the process of
the RSA based [6] certificate verification introduces O(M2)
overhead [34], where M is the modulus2 length. Introducers
have to handle the task of signing certificates, in which case
the overhead is O(M3).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Due to the microgrid’s special characteristics and require-
ments, existing key management solutions are not directly
applicable creating opportunities for innovation in the field.
MENSA is the first distributed hybrid key management and
authentication system for microgrids, which eliminates the
need for a Trusted Third Party (TTP) with high availability.
Its operation is based on a DHT for efficient discovery
of trust relationships among the microgrid nodes. Having
the administrative owner of the microgrid taking part during
the bootstrapping phase, we ensure that it will be hard for
malicious nodes to join the microgrid. After this phase, the
enforcement of a trust policy provides a decentralized and
flexible solution that promotes scalability and resilience.
The proposed key management solution is intended for
microgrids and can efficiently support network sizes of up to
30,000 nodes, as indicated by our simulation results. Moreover,
the diagram curves demonstrate that supporting larger network
sizes would be a viable option for MENSA.
We believe that MENSA will pave the way towards devel-
oping microgrids further and it will help realizing their full
potential in terms of scalability and performance efficiency.
On top of this lightweight solution, a wide range of intelligent
programs may find application, utilizing MENSA’s effective-
ness and swiftness.
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